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Abstract: IPOs on the EuroNMs have shown very high underpricing. The majority of 
these IPOs possess specific characteristics such as lock-up agreements, venture–capital 
financing,  ownership  by  the  underwriter  and  over-allotment  options.  We  study  how 
these  characteristics  influence  the  underpricing  of  firms  listed  on  the  two  largest 
EuroNM stock exchanges, the Neuer Markt of Germany and the Nouveau Marché of 
France.  We  find  that  the  high  underpricing  in  these  two  markets  –  contrary  to  the 
evidence on the US – is not driven by insiders’ selling behaviour. However, the large 
underpricing is caused by the high degree of riskiness of the issuing firms and by the 
partial adjustment phenomenon of offer prices to compensate institutional investors for 
the  truthful  revelation  of  their  demand  for  the  shares.  In  contrast,  venture–capital 
involvement  does  not  affect  underpricing.  For  France,  lock-up  agreements  act  as 
substitutes to underpricing, but not so for Germany. We also explore the reasons for the 
large difference in underpricing between the German and the French IPOs: German 
firms are more underpriced because they are more risky, have larger price revisions, 
have less stringent VC  lock-up contracts and mostly  go public during the hot issue 
period  of  1999-2000  when  the  general  level  of  underpricing  in  all  IPO  markets  is 
substantially higher.  
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Why are the French so different from the Germans?  
Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
 
I. Introduction   
The literature on firms that were floated during the dot com bubble years of 1999 and 
2000 documents that underpricing reached astronomical levels of more than 70% in the 
US markets (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003). Further, the IPOs of internet firms yielded 
first day returns of more than 96% during this period (Ofek and Richardson 2003). 
Relatively  high  underpricing  was  also  observed  on  a  number  of  European  markets 
(Ritter (2003)). In particular, Goergen et al. (2003) find that during the period of 1996 
to 2000, IPOs on the newly formed stock markets of Europe were underpriced by more 
than 30% on their first day of trading. 
This paper focuses on the reasons for the high underpricing of firms listed on the new 
stock markets of Europe (EuroNMs). Studying underpricing of IPOs on the EuroNMs is 
interesting for two reasons. First, being new stock markets, largely developed along the 
lines  of  NASDAQ,  the  EuroNMs  are  likely  to  provide  interesting  insights  into  the 
effectiveness of their regulation, their listing activity and performance. Second, IPOs on 
the EuroNMs are different from those on the other established primary markets of their 
country: the majority of these firms are high technology firms, with lock-up agreements 
and are floated via the book-building procedure. They frequently are venture–capital 
financed and often have over-allotment options.  
 The IPOs on the German and French EuroNMs
1 on which this study focuses, attracted 
more than 90% of all the EuroNM IPOs. Our results show underpricing in the German 
Neuer Markt of about 53% during the period of 1997 to 2000. This is about five times 
the  past  levels  of  underpricing  reported  by  Ljungqvist  (1997)  for  Germany.  In 
comparison, during the period of 1996 to 2000, the underpricing in the French Nouveau 
Marché amounts to 21%, about twice the past levels (Derrien  and Womack, 2003). 
Interestingly,  we  find  that  the  selling  behaviour  of  insiders  in  the  IPO  and  the 
involvement of venture capitalists do not have any impact on underpricing. In addition, 
price  revisions  during  the  offer  process  occur  more  frequently  in  Germany  and  are 
                                                 
1  The  first  EuroNM  was  created  in  1996  in  France  (the  Nouveau  Marché)  and  later  encompassed 
Germany  (Neuer  Markt),  the  Netherlands  (NMAX),  Belgium  (EuroNM  Belgium)  and  Italy  (Nuovo 
Mercato), which were all placed under the umbrella of EuroNM. Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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larger than those in France. This suggests that either the German investors were more 
forthcoming with information about the potential demand for shares enabling the firm’s 
investment bank to set a more accurate price or they were overoptimistic about their 
national  IPO  market  (or  both).  For  France,  lock-up  agreements  are  a  substitute  for 
underpricing. The more stringent the lock-up, the smaller is the level of underpricing. In 
some firms, the underwriters are also shareholders in the firms they are taking public. 
For Germany, this leads to higher underpricing whereas for France it has the opposite 
effect.  
Finally,  we  study  some  of  the  reasons  behind  the  large  differences  in  underpricing 
between the two markets. We find that German IPOs are more underpriced because they 
are relatively riskier, are providing a larger compensation for the truthful revelation of 
information by potential investors, have less stringent VC lock-up contracts and mostly 
come  to  the  market  during  the  hot  issue  period  of  1999-2000  when  the  average 
underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly discusses the creation 
(and  demise)  of  the  EuroNM  markets  and  compares  the  characteristics  of  the  two 
markets. Section  III reviews the current literature on underpricing of European new 
markets. Section IV then discusses the determinants of underpricing and formulates the 
hypotheses, while section V specifies the data sources and describes the sample. Section 
VI  documents  the  underpricing  in  the  two  EuroNMs  and  relates  it  to  the  IPO 
characteristics. Section VII discusses the results and section VIII concludes.  
 
II The rise and fall of the EuroNMs 
The European New Markets (EuroNMs) were launched in 1996/97 in order to facilitate 
the financing of innovative companies with a potential for high growth. Given that these 
firms were young and had no or little trading record, they were usually not able to meet 
the listing requirements of the primary markets. The French New Market (Nouveau 
Marché) was created first and commenced operating on 14 February 1996. At the end of 
2001,  the  total  market  capitalization  of  the  164  companies  listed  on  the  Nouveau 
Marché amounts to ￿ 15 billion. The fact that some of its entry requirements were less 
strict, was compensated by other stricter requirements (see Goergen et al. 2003). For 
example  there  was  no  requirement  in  terms  of  past  profitability,  but  there  was  a Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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minimum lock-up period of six months (covering 100% of shares held by the insiders 
immediately after the IPO) or one year (covering 80% of the insiders’ shares).  
As a consequence of the increasing demand for equity investments in Germany, the 
Deutsche Börse established the Neuer Markt on 10 March 1997. The number of firms 
seeking  a  Neuer  Markt  listing  took  off  with  11  flotations  in  1997  and  rose  to  a 
spectacular 143 in 2000. By the end of 2000, 325 companies were listed with a market 
capitalization in excess of ￿ 50 billion.  
On 25 March 1997, the Amsterdam Exchanges created a new market segment: the New 
Market of the Amsterdam Exchanges (NMAX). This initiative was soon followed by 
the  Brussels  Stock  Exchange,  which  created  EuroNM  Brussels  on  11  April  1997. 
However, in comparison to their French and  German counterparts, the EuroNMs of 
Amsterdam and Brussels have only known a modest success. The total number of IPOs 
on the Dutch and Belgian markets was 16 and 14, respectively. The youngest EuroNM 
is the Milanese Nuovo Mercato (recently renamed MTAX) which started with the IPO 
of Opengate SpA, an Italian IT services group on 17 June 1999 and is operated by Borsa 
Italiana.  Whilst  today  the  Nuovo  Mercato  has  only  39  listed  companies,  it  includes 
Tiscali, one of Europe’s largest internet service providers.  
Initially,  the  five  EuroNMs  experienced  a  spectacular  success  with  more  than  430 
companies listed by the end of year 2000. The total amount of capital raised on the 
EuroNMs exceeded ￿ 23.5 billion, and the total market capitalization was in excess of ￿ 
234 billion (Goergen et al. 2003). The market performance has also been impressive 
with the official EuroNM All-share Index rising by 561 per cent between the start of 
1998  and  March  2000,  just  prior  to the  bursting  of  the  ‘internet  bubble’.  However, 
because of difficulties of harmonizing different sets of listing rules, the existence of 
different  national  regulators  and  inefficient  cross-border  trading,  the  EuroNMs 
dissolved their partnership in December 2000. Consequently, the five EuroNMs went 
separate ways: the German Neuer Markt and the Italian Nuovo Mercato went their own 
ways whereas EuroNext was formed by the Belgian, Dutch and French EuroNMs. Since 
the dissolution of the EuroNMs, the new markets have suffered particularly badly from 
the decline in technology stocks with losses on some markets exceeding 80 per cent. 
Since 2001, there have been fewer than 20 IPOs on the new markets down from more 
than 200 in 2000. After a series of insider trading and price manipulation scandals, 
Deutsche Börse AG absorbed the Neuer Markt on 5
th June 2003.  Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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The listing and disclosure requirements on the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marché 
were very similar. For example, for both markets the issuer was required to have at least 
￿ 1.5m of equity capital. Both markets demanded that the minimum number of shares 
issued be at least 100,000 and the minimum market capitalization be at least ￿ 5m. 
Further, for both markets, the issuers were asked to have a minimum free float of 20 per 
cent and at least half of the shares offered in the IPO had to be primary shares. Both 
markets required issuers to adopt the GAAP accounting standard and report quarterly 
accounts.  However,  in  contrast  to  the  Neuer  Markt  which  had  a  six-month  lock-up 
period covering all the insiders’ shares, the Nouveau Marché locked up 80 per cent of 
the insiders’ shares for a period of 12 months or 100 per cent of their shares for 6 
months.  
 
III. Literature review 
The second half of the 1990s experienced the busiest IPO market in European history. 
This was also the period of the birth of the EuroNMs. Goergen et al. (2003) studied the 
underpricing of firms listed on all the EuroNMs. They found that underpricing in the 
different  EuroNM  markets  was  quite  high  and  quite  varied.  For  Germany,  average 
underpricing was around 54% whereas for France it was around 25%. The Belgian and 
Italian  IPOs  had  substantially  lower  underpricing  with  10%  and  19%,  respectively. 
Conversely, IPOs on the Dutch EuroNM were on average underpriced by about 86%. 
The authors argued that the listing rules for the EuroNMs were more lenient than those 
for the main markets and this led to a more cautious setting of the offer price resulting 
in  higher  underpricing.  Commenting  on  the  differences  in  underpricing  across  the 
different EuroNM markets, the authors stated that the underpricing on Dutch EuroNM 
was higher because this market used fixed price offers as compared to book-built offers 
in other EuroNM markets.  
Giudici  and  Roosenboom  (2004)  also  find  that  underpricing  on  the  EuroNMs  was 
considerably  higher  (about  22  percentage  points)  than  that  on  the  main  market 
segments. They argue that the higher underpricing on the EuroNMs is partially due to 
reduced incentives to control wealth losses since the insiders sell fewer shares in the 
IPO. Other factors responsible for the higher underpricing are higher price revisions, the 
hot issue market and distinct firm characteristics. Arosio, Giudici and Paleari (2000) Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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focus  on  the  underpricing  of  internet  stock  IPOs  on  the  EuroNMs.  They  find  that 
underpricing is strongly related to the information gathered during the book-building 
process. They document that when the final offer price is set equal to the maximum of 
the  initial  price  range,  the  level  of  underpricing  is  around  94%  while  there  is  no 
statistically significant underpricing if the final offer price is set equal to the minimum 
of the initial price range. Further, they report that underpricing is higher if the average 
first  day  return  of  previous  IPOs  has  been  higher.  However,  unlike  Giudici  and 
Roosenboom (2004) they do not find any relationship between underpricing and the 
dilution of insiders’ ownership in the IPO.  
Franzke (2004) studies the underpricing of German EuroNM IPOs by distinguishing 
between venture-capital backed IPOs and those without venture capital. She finds that 
there is no difference in underpricing between the two types of IPOs. Using the age of 
the VC as a proxy for its reputation, Franzke reports that the presence of prestigious 
VCs were associated with higher underpricing. Using a sample of IPOs similar to that 
used  by  Franzke  (2004),  Bessler  and  Kurth  (2004)  find  that  for  those  IPOs  whose 
underwriting  bank  was  also  providing  venture  capital  to  the  firm,  the  level  of 
underpricing is much higher.  
Even though some of the above papers analyse the underpricing of EuroNM IPOs, none 
of them investigates the causes for the high levels of underpricing and the reasons for 
the  large  difference  in  underpricing  between  the  EuroNM  markets.  However,  some 
recent studies of underpricing on the US markets during the dot com bubble do explain 
why  the  underpricing  was  so  severe.  For  instance,  Ljungqvist  and  Wilhelm  (2003) 
document that, for a sample of internet IPOs during the years 1999-2000, the level of 
underpricing was 89%, about 5 times the level of the mid-1990s. They find that the high 
underpricing is partially due to marked changes in the pre-IPO ownership structure and 
the insider selling behaviour in the IPO. During the dot com bubble period, pre-IPO 
ownership was fragmented, the stakes of pre-IPO CEOs were half their former level, 
and the frequency and magnitude of secondary sales by all insiders was smaller. There 
were also larger price revisions. 
In addition, Loughran and Ritter (2004) argue that part of the increase in underpricing 
of IPOs during the dot com bubble is attributable to the relatively higher risk of these 
firms, which gives support to the changing risk composition hypothesis. During the 
internet bubble period in the US, a high proportion of very young firms went public. Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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However, unlike Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), Loughran and Ritter do not find a 
relation between the sale of secondary shares and underpricing. In fact, Loughran and 
Ritter find that CEO ownership, as measured by the dollar value of holdings at the offer 
price,  was  twice  as  high  during  the  dot  com  bubble  period  as  compared  to  earlier 
periods.  They  argue  that  this  should  have  led  to  decreased  underpricing  during  the 
bubble period. Instead, they attribute much of the higher underpricing during the bubble 
period to a changing issuer objective function and argue that during this period there 
was less focus on maximising IPO proceeds due to an increased emphasis on analyst 
coverage. Issuing firms were seeking to hire high reputation underwriters with highly 
ranked analysts even though if it came at the cost of higher underpricing (the analyst 
lust hypothesis). In addition, beginning in the 1990s, the underwriters were making side 
payments to the executives of the issuing firms in the form of share allocations in hot 
IPOs.  This  practice  created  an  incentive  for  the  issuing  firm’s  management  to  seek 
rather than avoid underwriters with a reputation of severe underpricing (the spinning 
hypothesis). 
There are alternative explanations for the severe underpricing of US IPOs during the 
bubble period. For example, Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002) argue that issuers 
at  the  time  of  the  bubble  were  willing  to  underprice  more  in  order  to  generate  an 
information momentum (by attracting attention to the stock) resulting in higher market 
prices at the end of the lock-up period when insiders typically sell some of their shares. 
DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik (2002) state that high underpricing of internet IPOs 
was partly because of the media hype prior to the going-public. 
 
IV. The determinants of underpricing  
The theoretical literature on IPOs suggests a number of reasons for underpricing. For 
example,  IPOs  are  underpriced  because  of  underwriters’  risk  aversion,  information 
asymmetry and the winner’s curse, insurance against legal liabilities, and compensation 
to  (institutional)  investors  for  revealing  truthful  information  about  the  demand  for 
shares.
2 Below, we consider the determinants of underpricing in the context of the dot 
com bubble. 
 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of these and other reasons for underpricing, see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001).  Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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Ownership dilution and underpricing 
Habib  and  Ljungqvist  (2001)  develop  a  model  which  relates  underpricing  to  the 
insiders’ participation in the offering and the magnitude of the dilution they suffer on 
retained shares. They argue that if the insiders sell a large number of their shares in the 
IPO, then they should be more concerned about the level of underpricing.  Habib and 
Ljungqvist show that the larger the sale of secondary shares by the insiders, the lower is 
the underpricing. Similarly, the greater the dilution factor or the increase in the shares 
outstanding (as a result of the issuance of primary shares), the smaller is the level of 
underpricing. Therefore we hypothesise: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Larger insider participation in the offering and larger ownership dilution 
leads to lower underpricing.   
 
Similar to Habib and Ljungqvist, we measure the level of insider selling by the issue 
participation ratio which is defined as the number of secondary shares sold in the IPO 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the pre-IPO period. The dilution 
factor is defined as the number of primary shares issued in the IPO divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding before the IPO.  
 
Price revisions and underpricing 
Once the underwriter discloses the indicative price range (the book-building range) for 
the issue, information on the potential demand of the issue is collected from investors 
(for example through road shows). Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that potential 
investors need compensation for revealing truthful information about the demand of the 
issue.  The  underwriter  will  revise  the  price  upwards  if  it  receives  favourable 
information from the investors. However, it will increase the issue price to a level below 
the  ‘fair  price’  suggested  by  the  newly  revealed  information  (the  partial  adjustment 
phenomenon). This causes underpricing which compensates the investors who revealed 
truthful information. In order to guarantee the disclosure of favourable information, the 
price  adjustment  that  follows  the  revelation  of  bad  news  will  be  less  substantial, Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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resulting in less underpricing, than that following good news. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2003) make similar arguments.  
 
Hypothesis 2: A higher positive price revision of the IPO leads to higher underpricing.  
 
The price revision is measured as the percentage difference between the final offer price 
of the share and the mid-point of the book-building range.  
 
Lock-up periods vs. underpricing 
Espenlaub et al. (2001) and Brau et al. (2004) argue that issuers with more substantial 
information  asymmetries  should  have  longer  lock-up  periods.  The  literature  also 
predicts that firms with high ex ante uncertainty have higher underpricing. Further, the 
lock-up length and the underpricing may act as complementary devices. In contrast, 
Goergen et al. (2006) argue that underpricing is a substitute to the lock-up length and, 
therefore, firms that use higher underpricing should have shorter lock-up lengths. They 
find  support  for  their  assertion  for  a  sample  of  French  IPOs  that  show  a  negative 
relationship between underpricing and lock-up length. This discussion leads us to the 
following two competing hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Underpricing is a complement to the signal sent by the choice of the 
lock-up length.   
Hypothesis 3b: Alternatively, underpricing is a substitute to the signal emitted by the 
lock-up contract. A more stringent lock-up contract is then related to less underpricing. 
 
For every shareholder of every firm in our sample, we do not only measure the length of 
the lock-up period but  also the percentage of  his/her shares locked up. We classify 
shareholders as insiders (executives and founder-owners), VCs, and outsiders (all other 
types of shareholders). A major difference between German and French minimum lock-
ups  is  that  the  former  apply  to  all  the  pre-IPO  shareholders  who  still  hold  shares 
immediately after the IPO whereas the latter only apply to the insiders. For the German Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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EuroNM IPOs, the minimum lock-up period is 6 months after the IPO. For all the afore-
mentioned categories of shareholders, we calculate the percentage of post-IPO shares 
locked up for minimum requirement and locked-up beyond the minimum requirement. 
IPOs on the Nouveau Marché can choose between two alternative minimum lock-up 
contracts: a lock-up of 100% of the shares for 6 months or of 80% of the shares for 12 
months. Goergen et al. (2006) show that for France, these two minimum requirements 
are not equivalent and that the longer contract – despite covering only 80% of the shares 
– is perceived as more stringent. Therefore, we calculate the percentage of post-IPO 
shares locked up at the first minimum requirement (6 months 100%), locked up at the 
second minimum requirement (1 year, 80%), and locked up beyond the two minimum 
requirements. In addition, for France, we also calculate the percentage of VC shares not 
locked up. 
 
Underwriter’s stake vs. underpricing 
An interesting feature of the German and French EuroNM markets is that, in 15.47% of 
the German IPOs and 10.07% of the French ones, the underwriter hired by the issuer is 
also a pre-IPO shareholder. This creates an interesting dilemma for the underwriter: if 
the underwriter underprices the issue heavily, on the one hand it will incur a personal 
wealth  loss  on  the  share  stake  it  is  selling  in  the  IPO,  but  on  the  other  hand,  the 
underpricing may generate repeat business from clients who have been allocated some 
of  the  underpriced  shares.  In  contrast,  if  the  underwriter’s  setting  of  the  price  only 
creates modest underpricing, its personal wealth loss will be relatively small and so will 
be  the  chances  of  repeat  business.  We  arrive  at  the  following  two  competing 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: IPOs, whose underwriter is also a pre-IPO shareholder, show higher 
underpricing. 
Hypothesis 4b: Alternatively, IPOs, whose underwriter is also a pre-IPO shareholder, 
show smaller underpricing. 
 Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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We  measure  the  underwriter’s  ownership  by  the  shareholding  of  the  underwriter 
expressed as a percentage of the shares outstanding before the IPO. 
In addition to the variables described above, we also use a number of control variables 
such as the volatility of the share price in the first month of trading (to capture the ex 
ante uncertainty of the firm), firm age, reputation of the underwriter
3, a dummy variable 
capturing whether or not an overallotment option was present, and industry and time 
dummies. We also include lagged returns of the EuroNM All Share index (NEMAX ) 
measured over the quarter preceding the IPO in order to examine whether the degree of 
underpricing is correlated to past stock market movements (as do Loughran and Ritter 
2002). Table 1 summarises the hypotheses, the variables used and the predicted signs of 
their coefficients. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
V. Data sources and sample description   
We study the whole population of IPOs on the German Neuer Markt and the French 
Nouveau Marché during 1996 to 2000
4. During this period, there were 265 IPOs on the 
German market and 136 on the French market. Information on IPOs such as the date of 
the IPO, the offer price and other listing particulars were obtained directly from the 
exchanges. Firm specific information such as the firm age, underwriters of the issue, 
shares  sold  in  the  IPO,  lock-up  agreements  and  the  presence  of  VCs,  were  hand-
collected from the listing prospectuses. For the German market we completed the data 
using  the  annual  volumes  of  the  Hoppenstedt  Aktienführer  and  data  from  Deutsche 
Bank AG. The first-day share prices as well as information on industrial sectors were 
obtained from Datastream. 
Table  2  shows  some  of  the  characteristics  of  the  IPOs  on  the  German  and  French 
EuroNMs. These firms are significantly younger than IPOs on the first and second-tier 
exchanges. For example, the average age of an IPO firm on the Neuer Markt is about 13 
years whereas the average age of German IPOs on the Official and Regulated Markets is 
                                                 
3 This is only available for Germany. 
4 The German data starts in 1997. Our sample period ends in 2000 due to the collapse of the IPO market 
subsequent to the equity market crash in March 2000.  Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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more than 49 years (Goergen and Renneboog 2003).  For the Nouveau Marché, the 
average age of IPOs is about 11 years compared to 30 years for IPOs on other French 
markets (Chahine 2004). The market capitalization of the average French IPO is about 4 
times smaller than the average German  IPO (the difference is significant at the 5% 
level). In both markets venture capitalists have a strong presence with nearly 47% of the 
German  firms  and  57%  of  the  French  firms  having  at  least  one  VC  among  their 
shareholders (the difference is significant at the 5% level). Interestingly, the average 
length of lock-up agreements for both the markets is similar (around 10 months) despite 
the different rules on the minimum lock-up length. 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
Book-building is the pricing method used for all the IPOs in both markets
5. We find that 
for the majority of the German IPOs (about 75%); the final offer price is the same as the 
upper bound of the book-building range. For only about 8% of the IPOs, the final offer 
price is set to the lower bound. Few IPOs (only about 3%) are priced below the book-
building range. The majority of the IPOs with their final offer price at or below the 
lower bound came to the market in late 1999-2000, which was the period when the 
internet bubble burst. In contrast, only about half of the French IPOs (about 51%) are 
priced at the upper bound of their book-building range and for nearly 15%, the offer 
price is set at the lower bound. Similar to the German IPOs, few French IPOs (about 
4%) are priced below the book-building range. However, in contrast to the situation in 
Germany, there are a few French IPOs which are priced above the book-building range 
(only about 2%). The fact that for most of the German EuroNM IPOs the offer price 
was set at the top end of the book-building range indicates the high demand for the 
German new economy IPOs at that time. The demand for French IPOs was lower.  
One  new  and  interesting  feature  of  the  German  and  French  EuroNM  IPOs  is  the 
presence of an over-allotment (Greenshoe) option which provides underwriters with the 
option to sell additional shares (usually about 15% of the shares being sold in the IPO) 
in the market if demand is high. Over-allotment options are much more prevalent in 
                                                 
5 Only one firm in Germany did not use a book-building procedure. Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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Germany where about 90% of IPOs use them as compared to less than half in France 
(the difference is significant at the 5% level).  
The German and French EuroNM IPOs also differ in terms of their timing. The majority 
of IPOs in the German EuroNM went public at the climax of the dot com bubble years 
(1999 and 2000) whereas only about half of the French IPOs were floated in those years 
(the difference is significant at the 5% level). Finally, the owners of the German IPOs 
sell a higher  fraction of their holdings  (as the issue participation ratio is 9.26%) in 
comparison to their French counterparts which have an average issue participation ratio 
of 6.54% (the difference is significant at the 5% level). In addition, the dilution factor in 
Germany  (34%)  is  also  higher  than  that  in  France  (32%),  the  difference  being 
significant at the 5% level. Hence, for both markets the existing owners saw on average 
one third of their ownership being diluted as a result of primary shares sold in the IPO.  
 
VI. Underpricing in the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marché 
Table 3 shows the level of underpricing for the German and French EuroNMs during 
the  period  of  1996  to  2000.  The  average  underpricing  for  the  German  EuroNM  is 
around 53%, while that for the French EuroNM IPOs is substantially lower at 21%. This 
level  of  underpricing  is  unprecedented  for  both  markets  as  the  historical  level  of 
underpricing of IPOs in Germany and France has been around 10% (see Ljungqvist 
1997  for  Germany  and  Derrien  and  Womack  2003  for  France).  However,  it  is  still 
substantially lower than the underpricing of 89% in the US market during the same 
period (see Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003). 
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
A closer look at the quarterly and yearly underpricing yields some interesting facts. 
Underpricing in both markets is cyclical in nature (see figure 1). For  Germany, the 
initial returns for the first quarter of any year (except for 1997) are always substantially 
higher than those for any of the other quarters of the same year. For France, this pattern 
is somewhat less pronounced. For Germany, the level of underpricing surges abruptly 
from about 34% in 1997 to about 74% in 1998 and averages 51% in subsequent years. Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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Overall,  the  yearly  (average  and  median)  underpricing  for  Germany  is  always 
significantly higher than that for France.  
 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
Underpricing by industry 
Panel A of table 4 shows a cross-sectional analysis of IPO underpricing by industry. 
The majority of IPOs (64.9% in Germany and 59.3% in France) are in the Business 
Services industry (SIC 70-89) which has the highest underpricing amongst all industries 
in  Germany.  For  France,  the  largest  underpricing  occurs  in  the  Transport  &  Public 
Utilities industry (SIC 40-49), although it should be noted that the number of IPOs in 
this industry is small (6 firms). For both markets, the second most important industry in 
terms  of  the  number  of  IPOs  is  Manufacturing  (SIC  20-39).  Underpricing  in  this 
industry is high both for Germany (46.52%) and France (26.07%). When we delve into 
the various sectors forming the Business Services industry, we find that the majority of 
the  IPOs  from  this  industry  occur  in  computer-related  services  such  as  computer 
programming, pre-packaged software and integrated systems design. Panel B of table 4 
shows the level of underpricing in these sectors. The underpricing is larger in virtually 
all sectors of the Business Services industry in Germany. 
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
Ownership dilution vs. underpricing   
Panel A of Table 5 shows the frequency of the different types of pre-IPO shareholders 
in Germany and France. In both the markets, the majority of the IPO firms (70.85% in 
Germany and 79.66% in France) have a family or an individual (such as the founder) as 
their shareholder. Ownership by this type of shareholder is significantly higher at the 
10% level in France than in Germany.  About 12% of the German and 11% of the 
French firms have VCs as one of their pre-IPO owners. Other companies such as banks 
and financial institutions are present as one of the owners in 16.19% of the German and 
9.32% of the French firms (the difference is significant at the 10% level).  Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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Habib and Ljungqvist (2001, 2003) argue that insiders are more tolerant of underpricing 
if they sell fewer shares in the IPO. Their data corroborates their hypothesis for the case 
of US IPOs in 1999-2000. We verify whether this is also the case for the IPOs on the 
EuroNMs. Panel B of Table 5 shows the underpricing for firms with below and above-
median  participation  and  dilution  ratios.  Whereas  underpricing  significantly  differs 
between firms with above-median and below median issue participation/dilution ratios 
and also across the two countries, we do not find a relationship between underpricing 
and the level of insider participation or the dilution of their ownership at the flotation.  
 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
 
VCs and Underpricing  
Table 6 reports the presence of VCs in the German and French EuroNM markets before 
the IPO as well as their exit behaviour at the time of the IPO. Panel A of Table 6 shows 
that about 47% of the German and 57% of the French IPOs are backed by VCs. Out of 
the 99 different VCs operating in the German IPO market, 25 are domestic (i.e. they are 
members of the German VC association), while the remaining 74 are members of one or 
more  VC  associations  outside  Germany.  Nine  VCs  are  members  of  more  than  4 
international VC associations and invest in more than a third of all German firms with 
VC backing. Out of the 69 VCs on the French IPO market, 44 are domestic while the 
remaining 25 are members of one or more VC associations outside France. Only 3 VCs 
(ABN AMRO, 3i and Apax Partners) account for more than a quarter of all the VC-
backing in the French IPOs. About 41% of the German firms are backed by more than 
one VC. For example, there is a consortium of 12 different VCs in GPC Biotech AG. 
However,  the  average  number  of  VCs  per  firm  is  2,  with  a  median  value  of  1.  In 
comparison, almost 70% of the French VC backed IPOs have more than one VC as an 
investor. For example, ESI Group SA has 13 VCs, while the average number of VCs 
per French firm is 2.5 with a median of 2. We also find that there are only 8 venture 
capitalists that operate in both the German and French EuroNMs. Out of these, 3i backs 
21 German IPOs and 6 French IPOs, and ABN AMRO backs 8 French firms and one 
German IPO.   
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 [Insert table 6 about here] 
 
Panel B of Table 6 gives information on the exit behaviour of VCs in the IPO. In about 
27% of the VC-backed German firms, VCs hold on to all of their shares in the IPO. In 
about 31%, VCs sell up to 25% of their pre-IPO holdings, and in a quarter of German 
firms,  VCs  sell  between  25  and  50%.  In  only  4  firms,  VCs  liquidate  all  of  their 
shareholdings. In one exceptional case, a VC bought shares in a firm at the time of 
flotation. In about 42% of French VC-backed firms, the VCs retain all their shares at the 
IPO. In about 37% of the firms, the VCs sell anything up to 25% of their pre-IPO share 
stakes and in 15% of the IPOs they sell between 25 and 50% of their pre-IPO holdings. 
In only 6% of the IPOs, the VCs liquidate more than 50% of their holdings, but none 
liquidates  more  than  70%  of  its  shareholdings.  This  shows  that,  apart  from  a  few 
exceptions, in both German and French IPOs, VCs retain most of their shares after the 
IPO.  
The  evidence  on  the  relation  between  VC  involvement  and  underpricing  is  mixed. 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that VC-backed US IPOs show lower underpricing 
than other IPOs. However, Francis and Hasan (2001) and Lee and Wahal (2004) report 
higher underpricing for VC-backed IPOs. For the German EuroNM IPOs, we extend the 
study of Franzke (2004) by using other measures of VC reputation such as the domestic 
or international character of the VC, and whether the VC is UK/US-based or not. We 
also look at various other characteristics of VCs such as their sales in the IPO, the level 
of their post-IPO ownership and whether the VC is on the supervisory board of the 
issuing firm. Table 7 shows the level of underpricing in relation to the different VC 
characteristics. For Germany, the average level of underpricing for VC-backed firms is 
50.77% compared to 54.75% for firms without a VC. For France, VC-backed IPOs 
experience an average underpricing of 21% compared to 19.10% for IPOs without VC-
backing.  However,  for  both  markets,  the  difference  in  (both  mean  and  median) 
underpricing between VC-backed firms and other firms is not statistically significant.  
 
[Insert table 7 about here] 
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We categorise VCs as domestic if they  are a member of the VC association of the 
country in which the IPO is taking place and as international if they are a member of 
one or more VC associations of other countries.
6 We find that for both markets the level 
of underpricing for those IPOs which are backed by domestic VCs is similar to that for 
those which are backed by international VCs. Further, there are more German IPOs with 
UK/US-based VCs than French ones. However, their presence does not affect the level 
of underpricing. Therefore, it seems that the presence of VCs and their reputation does 
not influence the pricing of IPOs in the EuroNMs. 
If VCs have the power to influence the pricing of IPOs, the level of underpricing will be 
lower if they intend to sell the majority of their shares in the IPO. We check if the 
selling behaviour and the post-IPO stake of the VC are related to underpricing. We find 
that the level of underpricing, when VCs retain most of their share stakes after the IPO, 
is similar to the level of underpricing when VCs sell most of their holdings in the IPO. 
This is true for both markets. The post-IPO ownership held by the VCs in the German 
market does not seem to affect the level of underpricing. However, for those French 
IPOs  where  the  VC  holds  a  below-median  post-IPO  stake  in  the  firm,  the  level  of 
underpricing is much smaller than when the VC has an above-median ownership stake. 
Still, the difference (both in the mean and median) is not statistically significant. 
Finally, we examine whether VCs are represented on the supervisory board and/or the 
management  board  of  the  firms  they  invest  in  and  whether  this  has  an  impact  on 
underpricing. Out of the 124 VC-backed German firms, there are only 30 cases (24.2%) 
where  at  least  one  VC  is  a  member  of  the  supervisory  board  and  only  one  firm 
(WEB.DE AG) where the VC is a member of the management board. For France, out of 
the 57 VC-backed IPOs, 34 (59.6%) have at least one VC who is a member of the 
supervisory  board  and  only  3  firms  have  at  least  one  VC  represented  on  the 
management board (but not on the supervisory board). In only one firm (InfoVista SA), 
the VC is a member of both the supervisory and the management board. Even though a 
quarter of the German  VC-backed firms and around 60% of the French VC-backed 
                                                 
6 For example, Gold-Zack AG is a member of the German VC association only and has been classified as 
a domestic VC. Advent International is not a member of the German VC association but is a member of 
VC associations of 6 other countries and hence is classified as an international VC. Similarly for the 
French market, Banque De Vizille is a member of the French VC association only and is thus considered 
as domestic, whereas Innovacom is an international VC as it is a member of both the French and EU VC 
associations. 
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firms have VCs on the supervisory board, underpricing (both mean and median) in these 
IPOs is not statistically different from those IPOs without VC representation. However, 
for Germany, we still find a large economic difference in underpricing between the two 
types of IPOs (Table 7).   
To summarise, VCs do not seem to have an impact on the underpricing of IPOs in both 
EuroNM markets and therefore the validity of the hypothesis that VC backing signals 
quality is not corroborated for the EuroNM markets.  
 
The timing of Neuer Market IPOs and underpricing   
One interesting aspect of IPOs that usually goes unnoticed is their timing. Not all the 
firms go public on the initially announced date. For the German EuroNMs, we are able 
to collect information on the announcement dates for 133 IPOs. Out of these, 11 IPOs 
go public earlier than planned, 95 are floated as scheduled and 27 IPOs (around 20%) 
are postponed at least once
7. All the postponed (but eventually successful) IPOs are 
either from the Manufacturing or the Business Services industry. Table 8 shows that 
underwriters with a good reputation either float IPOs as scheduled (‘on-time’) or bring 




[Insert table 8 about here] 
 
The spread of the book-building range for all types of IPOs is close to ￿ 4. As expected, 
virtually all (90%) of the earlier IPOs and the vast majority (78%) of the IPOs that are 
floated on-time are priced at the upper bound of the range. In contrast, only 64.5% of 
the postponed IPOs are priced at the upper bound. We find that the majority of the 
earlier IPOs are VC-backed (about 78%). As for the underpricing, earlier and postponed 
IPOs show relatively smaller underpricing than those which are on-time. However, the 
difference in underpricing (both mean and median) is not statistically significant.  
                                                 
7 We do not have similar information on the IPOs on the French EuroNM and are therefore able not 
analyse the timing on the French market. 
8 For any of the above three categories of IPOs, the average time period between the first announcement 
and the actual date of IPO is around 17 to 20 days. Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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The average number of IPOs in the month preceding the announcement of the flotation 
is similar for all the three types of IPOs. Hence, the IPO activity in the market prior to 
the announcement of the flotation date does not seem to influence the flotation decision. 
However, the level of underpricing in the month preceding earlier IPOs is very high 
compared to that preceding IPOs that are on-time or are postponed. It may be that the 
observed large underpricing is interpreted by potential IPO candidates as a signal of 
high demand for IPO shares in the market, which then triggers the decision to float their 
IPO earlier than planned. In the same vein, issuers seem to postpone their IPOs if the 
feedback from the market is not positive, i.e. if the level of underpricing in the market is 
lower. Table 8 confirms that the level of underpricing in the month preceding postponed 
IPOs is considerably lower than that of earlier IPOs
9.  
 
VII. Regression analysis  
Models 1 and 2 of Table 9 explain the underpricing in the German and French EuroNM 
IPOs, respectively. For Model 2, we only consider French IPOs after 1 December 1998 
as, prior to this date, all insiders were required to be locked up for three years with 80% 
of their holdings. Given that the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marché both started 
around the same time, were members of the same EuroNM network with similar listing 
rules and had a number of similar firm characteristics such as age, VC backing, lock-up 
agreements  and  the  use  of  the  book  building  procedure,  the  large  difference  in 
underpricing between the two markets is intriguing. Model 3 explains the difference in 
underpricing between the two countries. 
Unlike the evidence from US IPOs, we do not find a statistically significant relation 
between  the  changes  in  insider  ownership  concentration  and  underpricing.  The 
coefficients on the issue participation ratio and dilution factor are statistically significant 
for neither the German nor the French markets. Thus, Habib and Ljungqvist’s (2001) 
assertion that the insiders set the offer price to minimise wealth losses in the IPO is not 
supported for these markets and we do not find support for Hypothesis 1. 
 
                                                 
9 The difference in means is not statistically significant. This could be because of the small sample size 
for earlier and postponed IPOs. However, the difference in medians (71.79% for earlier IPOs and 41.05% 
for postponed IPOs) is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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[Insert table 9 about here] 
 
We find that underpricing is positively related to the price revision. The higher the price 
revision,  the  higher  is  the  level  of  underpricing.  Therefore,  we  find  support  for 
Benveniste  and  Spindt’s  (1989)  argument  that  potential  investors  need  to  be 
compensated for revealing truthful information about the demand for the issue. Both the 
German and the French underwriters only partially adjust the final offer price towards 
the  firm  value  revealed  by  the  potential  investors.  Therefore,  we  fail  to  reject 
Hypothesis 2. 
For the German IPOs, there is no significant relation between the stringency of lock-up 
agreements  and  underpricing.  Neither  the  length  of  the  lock-up  agreements  nor  the 
fraction of the locked up shares acts as a substitute or as a complement to underpricing. 
For  France,  the  results  are  different:  if  VCs  are  locked  up  beyond  the  minimum 
requirements,  the  level  of  underpricing  is  smaller.  This  implies  that  the  lock-up 
contracts for VCs act as a substitute device for underpricing. Further, as the stringency 
of the insider lock-up agreements increases (from the first legal minimum contract to 
the second legal minimum requirement, and then beyond the two legal minima), the 
level  of  required  underpricing  decreases,  which  further  supports  the  substitution 
hypothesis for France.
10 Therefore, for the French market, there is general support for 
hypothesis 3b.  
We  find  that  the  fact  that  an  underwriter  is  also  a  shareholder  affects  the  level  of 
underpricing. For German IPOs with a shareholder-underwriter, the larger the number 
of pre-IPO shares owned by the underwriter, the larger is the underpricing. In contrast, 
this relation is negative for the French IPOs. These results suggest that the German and 
French  underwriters  have  conflicting  views  on  the  wealth  loss  caused  by  the 
underpricing and the benefits from obtaining future business. Even though the German 
underwriters sell a relatively higher proportion of their holdings in the IPO
11, for them 
                                                 
10  It  is  somewhat  puzzling  that  if  the  outsiders  (apart  from  the  VCs)  are  locked-up  beyond  the  two 
minimums, the level of underpricing is larger. However, there are only 9 out of 61 firms with outsiders 
locked up beyond the two minimum requirements. 
11 The selling behaviour of the German and French underwriters was quite different. For 30% of the 
German IPOs whose underwriter was also a shareholder, the underwriter did not sell any shares, whereas 
in nearly half of the IPOs, the underwriter sold more than 30% and in 16% of the IPOs the underwriter 
sold all its shares. In contrast, for the French IPOs whose underwriter was also a shareholder, in nearly Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
  20 
underpricing is an acceptable price to pay in order to secure a higher volume of future 
business and a high probability of a successful issue. The French underwriters provide 
evidence of the opposite behaviour. Therefore, we obtain support for Hypothesis 4a for 
Germany and for hypothesis 4b for France.
12 
When we control for the ex-ante uncertainty in the IPOs, we find that the higher the 
volatility of the share price, the larger is the level of underpricing. The results are highly 
significant and similar for both markets. Therefore, riskier firms are more underpriced. 
For  Germany,  we  do  not  find  any  relationship  between  underwriter  reputation  and 
underpricing.
13 Further, the size of the issuer, the presence of an over-allotment option 
and the age of the IPO firms do not have any impact on underpricing.  
For Germany, past market movements also have an impact on the level of underpricing. 
The  higher  the  market  return  in  the  quarter  prior  to  the  IPO,  the  higher  is  the 
underpricing. No such relationship is evident for the French IPOs. We also investigate 
the impact of the dot com bubble period (1999-2000), but do not find any significant 
impact on the underpricing of German and French IPOs. This contradicts the findings 
by Loughran and Ritter (2002) who report a positive relation between underpricing and 
past stock market movements in the US. The results in Table 9 further show that for 
Germany,  underpricing  is  not  industry  specific:  high-tech  issues  in  the  Business 
Services industry (SIC 70-89) are underpriced to a similar degree as flotations in more 
mature industries, such as Transport and Utilities (SIC 40-49).  
Finally,  model  3  estimates  the  determinants  of  the  differences  in  the  level  of 
underpricing  between  the  two  countries.  To  study  the  reasons  for  the  difference  in 
underpricing between the two markets, we match the German and French firms first by 
industry (using two digit SIC codes) and then by size (to the nearest ￿1,000,000 for 
small firms and ￿5,000,000 for large firms) using the market capitalisation at the offer 
price. We are able to match all the 61 French firms using these two criteria. The last 
column of Table 9 reports the results from an OLS regression with the difference in 
                                                                                                                                               
half of these IPOs the underwriters did not sell any of their shares and in only 16% of the IPOs the 
underwriter sold more than 30%. There were no IPOs in which the underwriter sold all of its shares. 
12 The difference in the impact of shareholder-underwriters on underpricing is not caused by differences 
in the market momentum as the coefficient on the interaction term between the two variables is not 
significantly different from zero. 
13  Franzke  (2004)  ranked  the  top  twelve  German  underwriters  based  on  their  underwriting  activity 
between 1997 and 2001. Her Table A2 (p. 229) gives more information on the calculations of reputation. 
We are not able to test this relationship for France because of the absence of any reliable measure of 
underwriter’s reputation. Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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underpricing between each pair of matched German and French IPOs as the dependent 
variable and the difference between the explanatory variables. The results show that the 
difference between the two markets in terms of ownership dilution (dilution factor and 
issue  participation  ratio)  does  not  explain  their  large  difference  in  underpricing. 
Conversely, the difference in the level of price revisions between the markets explains 
the difference in underpricing. From Table 2, we know that the average price revision in 
Germany is almost twice that in France. Table 9 confirms that the larger the difference 
in the price revision, the larger is the difference in underpricing.  
The difference in the stringency of VC lock-up agreements in terms of length and the 
percentage  of  shares  locked  up  explains  the  differences  in  underpricing  between 
Germany and France. The German IPOs show higher underpricing because a relatively 
smaller  percentage  of  VC  shares  are  locked  up  beyond  the  minimum  requirement. 
Indeed, Goergen et al. (2006) show that only  33% of the VC shares are locked up 
beyond  the  minimum  requirement  in  Germany  compared  to  60%  in  France.  The 
difference in the lock-up contracts of insiders and that for outsiders other than VCs do 
not explain the difference in underpricing between the two markets. 
The difference in the level of pre-IPO ownership by underwriters in the two countries 
does  not  explain  the  large  difference  in  underpricing  between  the  two  markets. 
However, the difference in ex-ante uncertainty - the average volatility of German IPOs 
is around 15.14% as compared to only 5.00% for French IPOs -  is one of the main 
reasons for the difference in underpricing. 
Finally, the frequent use of over-allotment options in the German firms (89% of IPOs 
have Greenshoe options in Germany as compared to only 46% of IPOs in France) does 
not explain the large difference in underpricing between the two countries. Likewise, 
the age difference between the matched pairs of German and French firms also fails to 
explain the difference in underpricing. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
IPOs on the EuroNMs are characterised by the presence of lock-up agreements, the use 
of  the  book-building  procedure  for  their  valuation,  venture-capital  backing,  the 
existence of over-allotment options and high levels of underpricing. In this paper, we 
first document some of these idiosyncrasies and then focus on how – if at all – they Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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influence the level of underpricing in the two largest members of EuroNM network, 
namely the Neuer Markt of Germany and Nouveau Marché of France.  
We find that all IPOs (except for one German IPO) use the book building procedure for 
their pricing. IPOs from both markets have lock-up periods in place which exceed the 
compulsory minimum. We also find that IPOs from these two markets are venture-
capital backed and that a large number of VCs do not sell any of their holdings in the 
IPO. Data on the German market show that a number of IPOs are either brought earlier 
to the market or have their flotation postponed. The majority of the IPOs that go public 
earlier than planned are VC backed. Therefore, it seems that VCs are able to time their 
issues well.  
Analysing the determinants of underpricing, we find that the high level of underpricing 
in these two markets is neither driven by insider selling behaviour nor by the dilution of 
insider ownership in the IPO. We show that IPOs are highly underpriced if they are 
risky  and  if  the  offer  price  is  revised  upwards.  Lock-up  agreements  seem  to  act  as 
substitute devices to underpricing for French IPOs. For French firms, if the VCs are 
locked up beyond the minimum requirement, then the underpricing is lower. Further, 
the more stringent the French lock-up, the smaller is the level of underpricing. The 
presence  of  underwriters  as  shareholders  has  a  positive  impact  on  underpricing  in 
Germany but a negative one in France. This suggests that German underwriters may 
have been willing to suffer wealth losses resulting from underpricing in order to capture 
future  business.  In  contrast,  French  underwriters  may  be  more  concerned  about 
minimising their personal wealth losses due to underpricing. Finally, we explore the 
reasons  for  the  large  difference  in  underpricing  between  the  German  and  French 
EuroNM  markets  and  find  that  German  firms  are  relatively  more  underpriced  than 
French firms because they are more risky, use larger price revisions have less stringent 
VC lock-up contracts and mostly go public during the hot issue period of 1999-2000 
when the general level of underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher.  Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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Table 1: Variables used and hypotheses tested 
 
Hypothesis                        Variable                               Expected sign of the coefficient 
 
          
 
Ownership dilution     Issue participation ratio              – 
vs. underpricing     Dilution factor                – 
(Hypothesis 1)                                               
          
 
Price revisions    Price revision                         + 
vs. underpricing 
(Hypothesis 2) 
         
 
Lock-up periods    % of VC shares not locked up            ? 
vs. underpricing    % of VC shares locked up beyond the minimum requirement    + Hyp 3a / – Hyp 3b 
(Hypothesis 3)    % of outsider shares (except VC) locked up for the 1st min. req.  + Hyp 3a / – Hyp 3b 
% of outsider shares (except VC) locked up for the 2nd min. req.  + Hyp 3a / – Hyp 3b 
 % of outsider shares (except VC) locked up beyond the min. req.  + Hyp 3a / – Hyp 3b 
% of insider shares locked up for the 1st minimum requirement  + Hyp 3a / – Hyp 3b 
% of insider shares locked up for the 2nd minimum requirement  + Hyp 3a / – Hyp 3b 
% of insider shares locked up beyond the minimum requirement  + Hyp 3a / – Hyp 3b 
 
     







Ex-ante uncertainty  Volatility of the share price in the first month of trading                    + 
 
Signalling    Underwriter reputation                            ? 
 
Size of the issuer   Market capitalisation at offer price              – 
 
Over-allotment    Dummy variable = 1 if over-allotment option present, zero otherwise                  + 
 
Ex-ante uncertainty  Age                                – 
 
Market conditions  Return on NEMAX index during the quarter before the IPO                    – 
 
Hot issue period    Dummy variable = 1 if the IPO was in 1999-2000, zero otherwise                  – 
 
Business cycles    Various industry dummies                           ? 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of German and French firms floated on the European New Markets.  
Age is calculated as the number of full years between the year of foundation and the year of the flotation. Market 
capitalization is measured at the end of the first day of trading. Price revision is the ratio of the difference between the 
offer price and the mid point of the bookbuilding range divided by the mid point of the book-building range. Over-
allotment options allow underwriters to purchase up to 15% additional shares beyond the number of registered shares in 
an IPO. The issue participation ratio is the number of secondary shares sold at the time of the IPO normalised by the 
number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. The dilution factor is the number of primary shares issued normalised by the 
number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. *, **, and *** stand for the statistical significance of the t-test on difference in 




for the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively of the two-tailed Z-test  for the equality 
between two proportions from two samples, assuming a binomial distribution. Under the null hypothesis that the two 
proportions are identical, Z is approximately distributed as a standard normal deviate (Kanji, 1995).  
 
 
  Germany  France 
Age (in years)  13.05        11.17** 
Average market capitalisation on  first trading day (￿ million)  314.35           75.94*** 
% of IPOs which are VC backed  46.8      56.8
++ 
Average lock-up length (months)  9.5  10.4 
% of IPOs that used book-building   99.3  100 
% of IPOs priced at the upper bound of the book-building range  75.4       51.6
+++ 
Average price revision (%)  4.23     2.70* 
% of IPOs with over-allotment options  89.18         45.65
+++ 
% of IPOs during the dot com bubble period (1999-2000)  82.84         52.17
+++ 
Issue participation ratio (%)  9.26       6.54*** 
Dilution factor (%)  34.37    32.14* Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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Table 3: Quarterly underpricing on the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marché  




+++stand for the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively of the two-tailed Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test which tests for a difference 
between the medians of 2 independent samples with similar shape distributions.  
Quarter  No. of IPOs   Average first day returns (%)   Median first day returns (%) 
   Germany  France  Germany  France  Germany  France 
Jan 96- Mar 96  -  1  -  -  -  - 
Apr 96- June 96  -  5  -  10.25  -  10.91 
July 96- Sept 96  -  2  -  -11.44  -  -11.44 
Oct 96- Dec 96  -  4  -  9.28  -  0.00 
For year 1996  -  12  -  5.95  -  6.71 
             
Jan 97- Mar 97  1  5  0  44.96  -  33.33 
Apr 97- June 97  1  3  106  11.5  -  0.00 
July 97- Sept 97  3  3  39.75  1.80  34.44  0.00 
Oct 97- Dec 97  4  5  20.06  -0.74  12.5  0.00 
For year 1997  9  16  33.95  15.64  24   0.01
+ 
             
Jan 98- Mar 98  2  3  187.31  15.26  187.31  15.56 
Apr 98- June 98  11  15  108.44  39.98  103.39  13.68 
July 98- Sept 98  13  7  40.29  8.88  32.9  0.00 
Oct 98- Dec 98  10  11  56.02  3.26  44.19  0.00 
For year 1998  36  36  73.65      20.65***  61.65     2.18
+++ 
             
Jan 99- Mar 99  15  9  127.82  0.55  88.42  -2.08 
Apr 99- June 99  35  9  35.53  6.20  6  0.00 
July 99- Sept 99  31  2  34.23  15.23  10.89  15.23 
Oct 99- Dec 99  25  8  47.55  67.20  33.33  51.31 
For year 1999  106  28  51.04    22.46***  24.5   8.85
++ 
             
Jan 00- Mar 00  34  4  99.36  157.47  88.65  187.34 
Apr 00- June 00  35  22  32.04  8.20  19.69  0.59 
July 00- Sept 00  30  13  37.17  22.87  13.53  14.47 
Oct 00- Dec 00  15  5  2.21  9.46  3.75  0.00 
For year 2000  114  44  49.54   26.25**  20.26     2.28
+++ 
For the period 1996(97) - 2000  265  136  52.89    21.06***  28.67     3.28
+++ Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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Table 4: Average underpricing by industry 
The first figure in parentheses is the median value, the second figure is the sample size and the third figure is the 
percentage of positive observations. *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance of the t-test on the difference in 
means between Germany and France at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, of the two-tailed test.
  








 SIC 20-39   
Manufacturing 
46.52% 
(29.17%, 51, 86.27%) 
26.07%** 
(10.25%, 33, 78.13%) 
 SIC 40-49  
Transport & Public Utilities  
23.5% 
(15.00%, 18, 58.82%) 
67.41% 
(2.14%, 6, 80%) 
 SIC 50-51   
Wholesale Trade 
54.95% 
(27.81%, 13, 100%) 
5.58% 
(0.1%, 10, 60%) 
 SIC 52-59 
Retail Trade   
42.65% 
(0.00%, 5, 40%) 
-0.35% 
(0.04%, 6, 60%) 
 SIC 60-67  
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate  
35.53% 
(17.92%, 7, 83.33%)  - 
 SIC 70-89   
Business Services 
60.68% 
(30.37%, 174, 82.66%) 
19.92%*** 
(4.4%, 80, 62.50%) 
     
 
Panel B: Average underpricing within different sectors of Business Services industry (SIC 73) 
 
SIC 73 






Custom Computer Prog. Services 
63.78% 
(33.33%, 42, 92.68%) 
13.5% 




(50.48, 21, 85.71%) 
14.41% 
(4.38%, 18, 72.22%) 
SIC 7373 
Comp. integrated systems design 
44.47% 
(30.00%, 23, 78.26%) 
114.64% 
(130.79%, 4, 100%) 
SIC 7379 
Computer related services 
35.4% 
(35.40%, 21, 79.17%) 
11.76%
 
(0.00%, 8, 42.86%) 
 
For all IPOs in SIC 73 
 
56.13% 
(30.40%, 107, 83.33%) 
25.39*** 
(4.4%, 39, 59.26%) 
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Table 5: Pre-IPO ownership and underpricing 
Panel A provides the frequency of different types of large shareholders in the pre-IPO period. The issue participation 
ratio is the number of secondary shares sold at the time of the IPO normalised by the number of pre-IPO shares 
outstanding. The dilution factor is the number of primary shares issued normalised by the number of pre-IPO shares 
outstanding. 
+ stands for the statistical significance at the 10%, respectively of the two-tailed Z-test for the equality 
between two proportions from two samples, assuming a binomial distribution. Under the null hypothesis that the two 
proportions are identical, Z is approximately distributed as a standard normal deviate (Kanji, 1995). *** stands for the 
statistical significance of the t-test on difference in means between Germany and France at the 1% level, of the two-
tailed test. 
Panel A: Frequency of  different types of shareholders for Germany and France in the pre-IPO period 
  Germany 
(% of  firms) 
France 
(% of firms) 
Pre-IPO Ownership by: 
                Family or individual 
                Venture Capitalist 
                Other companies 
                Own shares 















     
Panel B: Underpricing and the extent of insider participation at the IPO 




t-test: difference in 
means 
Issue participation ratio 
                Below median 
                Above median 













             Below median 
             Above median 
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Table 6: Characteristics of German and French VCs and their exit behaviour at the IPO 
Domestic VCs are those who are the members of the domestic VC association only. International VCs are those who are 
members of at least one VC association from outside their country of domicile. They may or may not be a member of 
their  domestic  VC  association.
  +, 
++,  and 
+++stand  for  the  statistical  significance  at  the  10%,  5%  and  1%  level, 
respectively of the two-tailed Z-test for the equality between two proportions from two samples, assuming a binomial 
distribution.  Under  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  two  proportions  are  identical,  Z  is  approximately  distributed  as  a 
standard normal deviate (Kanji, 1995).  
 
  Germany  France 
Panel A: VC backing before the IPO     
% of IPOs with VC backing  46.8%    56.8%
++ 
Total number of different VCs present  
Of these:   Domestic 





   63.8%
+++ 
   36.2%
+++ 
% of VC backed firms with more than 1 VC as a backer  41.1%     69.6%
+++ 
Average number of VCs per firm  2  2.5 
     
Panel B: Exit behaviour of VCs in the IPO     
% of firms with VCs retaining all shares  27.2%    41.8%
++ 
%  of  firms  with  VCs  selling  up  to  25%  of  their 
shareholdings 
31.2%  37.3% 
% of firms with VCs selling between 25% and 50%   25.6%  14.9%
+ 
% of firms with VCs selling more than 50%   16.0%    6.0%
++ Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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Table 7:  Average underpricing of IPOs by type of VC backing 
The first figure in parentheses is the median value, the second figure is the sample size and the third figure is the percentage of 
positive observations. *** stands for the statistical significance of the t-test on difference in means between Germany and France at 
the 1% level of the two-tailed test. The difference of medians is tested by the two-tailed Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test which tests 
for a difference between the medians of 2 independent samples with similar shape distributions. Domestic VCs are members of the 
domestic VC association only. International VCs are those who are members of at least one VC association; they may or may not be 













VC present at IPO 
 
50.77% 
(28.76%, 124, 81.45%) 
21.00% 
(2.56%, 71, 57.74%) 
3.77*** 
 
No VC present at IPO 
 
54.75% 
(28.57%, 141, 81.56%) 
19.10% 
(0.01%, 57, 52.63%) 
4.31*** 
 
t-test for difference in means 








(28.67%, 43, 79.07%) 
16.01% 






(29.61%, 82, 82.93%) 
19.99% 
(7.20%, 32, 56.25%) 
-3.26*** 
 
t-test for difference in means 




0.94   
UK/US based VC 
 
59.50% 
(36.94%, 44, 86.36%) 
24.84% 
(5.28%, 17, 52.94%) 
-2.13*** 
 
Non UK/US based VC 
 
50.82% 
(20.52%, 81, 79.01%) 
15.32% 
(3.40%, 51, 62.50%) 
-4.06*** 
 
t-test for difference in means 




 0.83   
Below median sell-off by the VCs 
 
52.32% 
(28.28%, 62, 83.87%) 
15.33% 
(5.28%, 33, 60.61%) 
-3.53*** 
 
Above median sell-off by the VCs 
 
56.30% 
(30.52%, 62, 80.65%) 
17.41% 
(3.05%, 32, 59.38%) 
-3.62*** 
 
t-test for difference in means 




0.98   




(26.83%, 62, 77.42%) 
 
13.07% 




Above median post-IPO ownership 
of VCs 
54.85% 
(30.13%, 62, 85.48%) 
22.28% 
(3.53%, 34, 58.82%) 
-2.90*** 
 
t-test for difference in means 











(31.10%, 30, 90%) 
 
20.00% 




VC is not a member of the 
supervisory board 
49.62% 
(28.67%, 95, 78.95%) 
 
15.39% 
(2.14%, 35, 60.61%) 
3.97*** 
 
t-test for difference in means 
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Table 8: Characteristics of the German IPOs that are earlier, on-time or postponed  
Earlier are those IPOs that are brought to the market prior to the intended date. On-time are those IPOs which are brought to the 
market on the intended date. Postponed are IPOs that were postponed at least once. Franzke’s (2004) method is used to measure 
underwriter reputation. The higher the value, the better the underwriter reputation. The average market return is the return on the 
EuroNM All Share index (NEMAX) in the month before the first announcement day of the IPO. The numbers in brackets represent 
the minimum, maximum, median and standard deviation. Information on the announcement dates of only 133 IPOs was available. 
 
  Earlier   
(11 IPOs) 
 




Underwriter reputation  1.40  1.39  1.26 
Average  number  of  days  between  first 
announcement and first day of trading  
17 
(6, 27, 19, 7) 
20 
(1, 72, 20, 12) 
17.2 
(5, 40, 16, 9) 
Average book-building range (BBR) (in ￿)  18.68 –  22.29  22.15 –  26.03  25.45 – 29.78 
Average spread of BBR (in ￿)  3.79  3.94  4.33 
Average offer price (in ￿)  21.89  25.54  28.36 
% of firms with offer price equal to upper 
bound of BBR 
90%  77.55%  64.5% 
% of firms with VC-backing  77.78%  45.45%  56.00% 
Average underpricing  45.21%  63.48%  46.72% 
Average  no.  of  IPOs  in  month  before 
announcement date 
7.4  8.28  6.29 
Average  underpricing  in  month  before 
announcement date 
86.75%  63.8%  51.37% 
Average  market  return  in  month  before 
announcement date 
6.42%  5.11%  6.59% 
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Table 9: The determinants of underpricing in German and French EuroNM IPOs 
The dependent variable is the natural log of the first day return. The issue participation ratio is the number of secondary shares sold at the IPO divided by the total number of shares outstanding in 
the pre-IPO period. The dilution factor is the number of primary shares issued at the IPO divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the pre-IPO period. Price revision is the percentage 
difference between the final offer price of the share and the mid-point of the book-building range. For France there is a choice between two minimum lock up contracts, 100% of the shares locked 
up for 6 months (first minimum requirement) or 80% locked up for 12 months (second minimum requirement). For Germany the minimum requirement is 100% of the shares locked-up for 6 
months. Insider shares refer to the shares held by the executives and founder-owners. % shares owned by the underwriter are for the pre-IPO period. Volatility of the stock price measures the 
standard deviation of share returns over the first month of trading. Underwriter reputation for Germany is measured as in Franzke (2004). No such measure is available for France. Size is measured 
as the natural log of the market capitalisation at the offer price. Greenshoe is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an over-allotment option is present in the IPO and zero otherwise. Models 1 
and 2 study the underpricing in Germany and France, respectively. Model 3 studies the difference in underpricing between the two countries. Model 2 considers French firms that came for an IPO 
after 1 December 1998. Before this period all insiders were locked-up for three years for 80% of their holdings. The figures in parentheses are the t-stats. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance 







Difference in underpricing 
Model (3) 
Constant           3.58   (2.72)***            3.61    (2.29)**                0.036   (0.17) 
Issue participation ratio          -0.61   (-1.15)           -0.003  (-0.43)                0.006   (0.67) 
Dilution Factor           0.14   (0.51)           -0.33 x 10
-3 (-0.04)                0.016   (1.57) 
Price Revision           3.42   (6.33)***            0.040   (3.92)***                0.023   (2.41)** 
% of VC shares not locked-up              0.11    (0.59)   
% of VC shares locked-up beyond the minimum requirement          -0.55 x 10
-3 (-0.42)           -0.97    (-3.12)***              -0.005   (-1.72)* 
% of outsider shares (except VC) locked-up for the first minimum requirement              -0.06    (-0.33)   
% of outsider shares (except VC) locked-up for the second minimum requirement               0.17    (0.92)   
% of outsider shares (except VC) locked-up beyond the minimum requirement           0.50 x 10
-3  (0.34)            0.90    (2.41)**               0.004   (0.94) 
% of insider shares locked-up for the first minimum requirement               0.78    (2.75)***   
% of insider shares locked-up for the second minimum requirement              0.65    (2.53)**   
% of insider shares locked-up beyond the minimum requirement           0.13 x 10
-3  (0.10)            0.56    (2.71)***              -0.004   (-0.78) 
% shares owned by the underwriter            1.22    (1.75)*           -2.18    (-2.84)***              -1.27     (-0.68) 
Volatility of Stock Price           4.68    (3.26)***            11.60   (4.13)***               8.21     (3.14)*** 
Underwriter reputation           -0.006  (-0.11)     
Size of the issuer          -0.12    (-0.18)           -0.07    (-0.77)   
Greenshoe present          -0.14    (-0.97)            0.11    (0.82)              -0.027   (-0.15) 
Age of the issuer           0.02    (0.30)            0.03    (0.43)               0.106   (0.90) 
Return on NEMAX index during the quarter before the IPO           0.007  (5.05)***            0.92 x 10
-3  (0.49)   
Bubble (1999-2000)           0.17    (1.55)            0.08    (0.55)               0.272   (1.78)* 
SIC 20-39 (Manufacturing)              0.11    (0.47)   
SIC 40-49 (Transport and public utilities)          -0.14    (-0.54)            0.39    (1.95)*   
SIC 50-51 (Wholesale trade)           0.27    (1.18)           -0.39    (-1.15)   
SIC 60-67 (Fin., Insurance and real estate)          -0.10    (-0.41)     
SIC 70-89 (Business Services)           0.07    (0.57)     
Adj. R
2          27.60%           42.39%              23.11% 
Sample          262           61               61 
P value (F statistic)          0.00           0.00              0.01 Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets 
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Figure 1: The quarterly pattern of underpricing in Germany and France over the years 1996-2000 
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